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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEARL H. STEFFENSEN,

j

Plaintiff/Petitioner,
i

Case No.

vs.
SMITHfS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

]i

Priority No. 13

Defendant/Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen presents the
following questions for review:
I.

Did the court of appeals erroneously apply a harmless

error analysis after it determined that the trial court committed
error by directing a verdict in favor of Defendant/Respondent
Smith's Management Corporation ("Smith's")?
A.

Is a harmless error analysis appropriate when the

appellate court holds that the directed verdict was erroneously
granted by the trial court?
B.

Even if a harmless error analysis is appropriate

in such circumstances, is such an analysis appropriate in this
case?
1

II.

Did the court of appeals erroneously classify

foreseeability and overrule a Utah Supreme Court case in holding
that jury Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was
harmless?
III. Did the court of appeals erroneously affirm the
exclusion of evidence in contravention of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and Utah Supreme Court case law?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals1 opinion, Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp., 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), was
issued on October 29, 1991. (Addendum A).

Mrs. Steffensen's

petition for rehearing was denied on November 19, 1991, and the
denial was filed on November 20, 1991.

(Addendum B ) .

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition under
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991) which grants the Utah
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over "a judgment of the
court of appeals11.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or
rules pertinent to the questions presented for review is
contained in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two year old
woman, was seriously injured while shopping at a Smith's store
located at 2100 South and 900 East in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2

(R.

1242 at 5-6). The pertinent facts are set forth in the court
appeals' opinion except that the court's statement concerning
number of

employees involved in the collision is inaccurate:

On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered a
Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and cigarettes.
Gary Canham, the store's front-end manager, observed
Mr. Burnett take beer and cigarettes from the store's
shelves. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the front of the
store, Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might attempt
to leave the store without paying for the merchandise.
Mr. Canham immediately informed Paul Rompus, Smith's
Drug King manager, and together the two watched Mr.
Burnett from the office area at the front of the store.
As Mr. Burnett walked toward the front of the store, he
noticed the two managers and felt they were watching
him. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a checkout stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no
longer being watched, he got out of line and walked
quickly toward the door with the merchandise.
The two managers then confronted Mr. Burnett and
asked him to come with them to their office. As the
three walked toward the office, Mr. Rompus called out
to another employee at the front of the store, telling
her to call the police. As the group reached the
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke" toward the
exit, dropping the beer and cigarettes as he ran. Mr.
Rompus yelled "stop him - see if you can stop him" in
an effort to engage the assistance of others.
Responding to the call for help, another employee
attempted to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett dodged this
employee, turning in a different direction, and as he
did so, ran directly into another employee. Mr.
Burnett "bounced" off this employee directly into the
plaintiff, Mrs. Steffensen, who was standing at the
customer service counter writing a check. [Actually,
Mr. Burnett ricocheted off the employee who had assumed
the football stance rather than another employee. (T.
196)] The force of the collision knocked Mrs.
Steffensen to the ground, where she struck her head on
the tile floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the
hospital and has since suffered severe "stroke-like"
paralysis to the entire left side of her body.
172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37.
Mrs. Steffensen commenced this action against Smith's
3

alleging that Smith's negligence was the cause of her injuries•
Among other things, Mrs. Steffensen alleged that Smith's failed
to properly train its employees to deal with shoplifters; that
Smith's employees violated Smith's policies before apprehending
Mr. Burnett by failing to deter him; and that Smith's employees
violated Smith's policies by chasing and attempting to stop Mr.
Burnett after he ran from them.

After presentation of all the

evidence, Smith's counsel moved for a partial directed verdict on
the grounds that Smith's failure to adequately train its
employees and to deter Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not be
the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.
judge granted Smith's motion.

(R. 1216).

The trial

The jury found that

Smith's had acted negligently but that the negligence was not the
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

(R. 1155)

Mrs. Steffensen appealed to the court of appeals claiming:
(1) the trial court improperly granted the partial directed
verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No.
32 which required the jury to find that Smith's employees must be
able to specifically predict Mr. Burnett's actions in order to
find that Smith's actions caused Mrs. Steffensen's injuries, and
(3) that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony
regarding Smith's training practices and the apportionment of
fault between Smith's and Mr. Burnett.

The court of appeals held

that the trial court committed error in granting the partial
directed verdict.

However, the court of appeals then applied a

harmless error analysis and held that the trial court's error was
4

harmless.

Id.

The court of appeals also held that Instruction

No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was harmless.
Adv. Rep. at 40.

172 Utah

Finally, the court of appeals held the

exclusion of expert testimony on employee training was harmless
error and that the exclusion of testimony on the apportionment of
fault was proper.

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
GRANTED SMITHS MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
When the court of appeals applied a harmless error analysis
after determining that the trial court erroneously granted the
motion for a partial directed verdict, it decided an important
question of state law not previously considered by this Court and
it decided a question of state law in a way that conflicts with
dozens of cases decided by this Court over a period of decades.
Utah R. App. P. 46(b) & (d). Because of the import of the court
of appeals' unprecedented action and its potential impact on
numerous cases beyond this case, the Supreme Court should review
the actions of the court of appeals.
On appeal Mrs. Steffensen asserted that the trial court
improperly granted a partially directed verdict on the element of
proximate cause in favor of Smith1s. Mrs. Steffensen alleged
that Smith's had been negligent in failing to properly train its
employees to deter a shoplifter.
5

Smith's employees manual

advocated deterrence techniques.
4.

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, 41 n.

Further, Mrs. Steffensen claimed that Smith's failed to train

its employees and to implement procedures to properly handle a
shoplifter once a decision to apprehend was made.

The company

manuals contained policies of restraint in such situations.
Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, 41 n. 4.

172

The trial court granted Smith's

motion for a partial directed verdict, ruling as a matter of law
that Smith's "actions that took place prior to the time that the
shoplifter was detained" could not be the proximate cause of Mrs.
Steffensen's injury.

(Addendum C at 7).

The jury was then

instructed that none of Smith's conduct before the stop of the
shoplifter could be considered the proximate cause of Mrs.
Steffensen's injuries.
The court of appeals held that the trial court's ruling on
the motion for partial directed verdict was erroneous and
declared:
There was probably sufficient evidence
produced from which a reasonable juror could
infer that Smith's failure to deter was a
negligent act, as it would have been
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately
trained employee that his or her decision to
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store
could have led to a customer's injury.
Steffensen, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39 (footnote omitted).
However, after reaching this conclusion, the court applied a
harmless error analysis and determined that the trial court's
error had been harmless.

6

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED A
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS TO A PARTIAL DIRECTED
VERDICT WHICH HAD BEEN ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.

When the court of appeals held that the trial court
erroneously granted a directed verdict, its subsequent
application of a harmless error analysis was inconsistent with
the required standard of review in such cases as previously
applied by this Court.

A directed verdict is only appropriate

when a trial court is able to conclude that reasonable minds
would not differ on the facts from the evidence presented.
Management Comm. v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 652 P. 2d 896, 897-98
(Utah 1982).

Furthermore, in making its determination the trial

court is required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict is
sought.

Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980).

An

appellate court reviewing a directed verdict must apply the same
standard as the trial court. Management Comm., 652 P.2d at 898;
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611
(Utah 1982).

Therefore, if the appellate court finds that there

was a reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences drawn
therefrom that would allow reasonable minds to differ on the
facts determined from the evidence and that would support a
verdict in favor of the losing party, "the directed verdict
cannot be sustained."

Management Comm,, 652 P.2d at 898.

A trial court is prohibited from considering the weight of
the evidence in passing on a motion for directed verdict,
Cerritos Trucking Co., 645 P.2d at 613, and the standard of
7

review imposes the same limitation on the appellate court.

The

appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury.

By holding that the trial court erred in granting a

directed verdict, the appellate court has concluded that
reasonable minds could differ on the facts from the evidence
presented and that a verdict could have been entered for the
losing party.
In contrast, this Court has stated that harmless errors are
"errors which, although properly preserved below and presented on
appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings."
1989) .

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah

When an appellate court holds that reasonable minds

could differ on the evidence and a verdict could have been
entered for the losing party, as the court of appeals did in this
case, the appellate court is admitting that the error is not
inconsequential and that there is a "reasonable likelihood that
the error affected the outcome."

The required basis for a

finding of error is simply incompatible with a harmless error
analysis.

Entertaining a harmless error analysis in such a

situation would be similar to considering a harmless error
analysis in the case of an erroneously granted summary judgment;

State v. Verde is the case cited by the court of appeals
to justify its harmless error analysis. However, Verde is not a
civil case and does not involve a directed verdict. The quotation
cited in the text and relied on by the court of appeals was part
of a longer discourse on the meaning of the term "manifest
injustice" under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c).
8

the required standard of review is inconsistent with a finding of
harmless error.
A review of 40 years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court
reveals that the Court has never held an erroneously granted
directed verdict to be harmless error.2

Cases of erroneously

granted directed verdicts are reversed and remanded.

See e.g.,

Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934 (Utah
1989);

Whitaker v. Nichols, 699 P.2d 685 (Utah 1985); Acculog,

Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984);
P.2d 723 (Utah 1983);

Cruz v. Montoya, 660

Management Committee v. Greystone Pines,

Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982);

Little America Refining Co. v.

Levba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982);

Seecrmiller v. KSL, Inc.. 626

P.2d 968 (Utah 1981).
One commentator has noted the inapplicability of the
harmless error standard to an erroneously granted directed
verdict:
Whenever the appellant introduces sufficient
evidence to take his case to the jury, there
exists the possibility that the jury might
have found a verdict for him, had the error
not intervened. Hence, in such a situation
it would seem impossible for an appellate
court to determine definitely that the
verdict for the respondent was unaffected by
the erroneous matter . . .
Only with such a standard as that set out
above or to phrase it differently,
disregarding the matter complained of, no
reasonable jury could have come to any other
verdict, can the appellate court validly
assert that it is not usurping the function
The forty year period cited is an artificial limit
imposed by Petitioner's counsel and has no significance.
9

of the jury. For, unless the weight of the
evidence is so overwhelming, no conclusive
determination can be made as to the effect of
the error on the verdict. The determination
becomes rather that the verdict was not
incorrect in spite of the error. Appellate
courts that say this put themselves in the
jury box.
Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 450,
458-59 (1947).
In this case the novel action of the court of appeals
usurped the jury's function and effectively violated Mrs.
Steffensen's right to a jury trial guaranteed by the seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I section
10 of the Utah Constitution.

The usurpation occurred despite the

court's statement that a reasonable juror could have found for
Mrs. Steffensen.

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39.

Because this is an

issue of first impression with a large potential impact, this
Court should review the issue.
B.

EVEN IF A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS APPROPRIATE
IN A CASE OF AN ERRONEOUSLY DIRECTED VERDICT, THE
ERROR IN THIS CASE WAS NOT HARMLESS.

In its opinion in this case, the court of appeals stated
that Mrs. Steffensen introduced "substantial expert testimony"
that deterrence prevents shoplifting and thus "promote[s]
customer safety."

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39.

Furthermore, the

court noted that "the experts testified that a retail store
should also train its employees to use care when apprehending a
shoplifter."

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. These factors led to the

court's conclusion that the trial court's ruling was incorrect
10

and that there was "probably sufficient evidence produced from
which a reasonable juror could infer that Smith's failure to
deter was a negligent act" and that "it would have been
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately trained employee" that
the decision to chase a shoplifter in a crowded store could lead
to the injury of a customer.

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39.

(emphasis added)
The court of appeals justified the error as harmless because
the jury found that Smith's negligence was not the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries and the court of appeals
concluded that the jury would not have changed its verdict on
proximate cause.

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. However, the court

of appeals' conclusion is erroneous.

The trial court, after

granting Smith's motion for a partial directed verdict,
instructed the jury that Smith's conduct prior to the stop of the
shoplifter could not be considered:
You have heard testimony regarding events
that occurred prior to the time of the stop
of the shoplifter, Mr. Burnett. You are
instructed that none of the actions by
Smith's employees prior to the stop and
detention proximately caused plaintiff's
injuries. Therefore, you must not take this
testimony into consideration when
deliberating and making your decision.
This instruction eliminated all evidence concerning the
value of deterrence in reducing shoplifting, all evidence
concerning specific deterrence of the shoplifter in this case,
all evidence concerning Smith's employees' knowledge of the store
policy to let fleeing shoplifters escape, and all evidence
11

concerning training of employees not to yell "stop him - see if
you can stop him."

The jury could have concluded from any or all

of the excluded evidence that there was a reasonable connection
between Smith's acts or omissions and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.
See e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §41 at 266 (5th
ed. 1984).
In each instance cited, Smith's conduct could reasonably be
seen as the cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

For example, if

Smith's employees had continued the specific deterrence of Mr.
Burnett which forced him to stand in a check out line, he
ultimately would have been forced to either purchase the items or
leave them and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not have
occurred.

Similarly, if Smith's employees had adequate knowledge

to allow fleeing shoplifters to escape, as per store policy, Mr.
Rompus would not have chased Mr. Burnett and yelled for other
employees to stop him and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not
have occurred.

If employees had been trained to allow fleeing

shoplifters to escape, the store employee who assumed the
football stance may not have done so and Mrs. Steffensen's
injuries would not have occurred.

Thus, in each instance, the

jury could have found Smith's conduct to be the proximate cause
of the injuries.

The court of appeals' conclusion to the

contrary is unsupported and should be reversed.

12

POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS SUB SILENTIO OVERRULED A UTAH SUPREME COURT
CASE IN ITS DECISION CONCERNING INSTRUCTION NO. 32.
GIVING THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR.
Mrs. Steffensen claimed on appeal that the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury on the issue of foreseeability.
The trial court gave the following instruction:
Foreseeability in these instructions means
injury or harm, if any, to a customer which
the defendant and its employees could have
reasonable anticipated as the natural
consequences of their actions, if any, even
though they were not able to anticipate the
particular injury which did occur.
In determining what is foreseeable you must
determine that the actions of Bradley Burnett
were predictable by Smith's employees and not
just a mere possibility.
On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that the instruction at
issue, Instruction No. 32, was erroneous.

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at

40 (Instruction No. 32 is found in Addendum C).

However, the

court applied a harmless error analysis and concluded that any
error in the instruction was harmless because "[t]he question of
foreseeability goes to the issue of negligence, and the jury
found Smith negligent."

172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40.

While the court was theoretically correct in stating that
foreseeability is related to negligence, the issue is not quite
so clear.

For example, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized a

connection between foreseeability and both negligence and
proximate cause.

In Rees v. Albertsonfs, Inc., 587 P.2d 130,

133 (Utah 1978), the Court stated:
13

"What is necessary to meet

the test of negligence and proximate cause is that it be
reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of
the same general nature."

(emphasis added)

In its opinion in

this case, the court of appeals effectively overruled that
portion of Rees.
Support exists for the Rees position because foreseeability
may be relevant to both proximate cause and negligence.

See,

e.g., W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, §43 at 298 (5th ed.
1984) ("foreseeability in proximate cause means the same thing as
in negligence; . . . the same considerations that determine the
original culpability are to be used again to determine liability
for consequences.");

4 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of

Torts, § 20.5 at 163 (2d ed. 1986) ("Foreseeability does not mean
the precise hazard or exact consequences that were encountered
should have been foreseen.

Upon this all are agreed whether they

regard foreseeability as relevant only to the duty issue, or to
questions of proximate cause as well.")

See generally Green,

Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961).
Even the Restatement of Torts includes foreseeability in its
proximate cause sections.

See 4 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray,

The Law of Torts, §20.5 at 168 (2d ed 1986) ("The formula chosen
by the Restatement in its section on proximate cause, with its
emphasis on what seems to be 'extraordinary1 in the light of
hindsight seems to abandon the foreseeability test.
analysis shows that it does not.")
14

But careful

Because of the confusion which surrounds the place of
foreseeability in the law of torts, the court of appeals'
statement that the error in this case was harmless because
foreseeability concerns only negligence would be accurate only if
the jury was adequately instructed on the meanings of negligence
and proximate cause.

The instructions in this case do not

clarify the concepts enough for the jury to adequately
distinguish between the two. Therefore, the error in Instruction
No. 32, which Smith's characterizes as "unfortunate" could not be
termed harmless.
The quotation from Harper, James & Gray cited above
highlights the error in Instruction No. 32; the instruction
erroneously requires the jury to find that Smith's could
specifically predict the behavior of Mr. Burnett.

When this

instruction was coupled with the trial court's erroneous directed
verdict, the jury was constrained to find Smith's did not
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. Viewed together
the instructions predict the verdict and deprived Mrs. Steffensen
of her right to have the jury decide the facts of the case.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS MISINTERPRETED RULE 704 OF THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE AND IGNORED UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE LAW IN
UPHOLDING THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE.
Mrs. Steffensen asserted on appeal that the trial judge
improperly excluded portions of her experts' testimony.
Specifically, the trial court refused to allow the experts to
15

testify concerning employee training in techniques of deterring
shoplifters.

The trial court also excluded testimony from an

expert which would have apportioned fault between the shoplifter
and Smiths employees.

The court of appeals found that the error

in exclusion of testimony on employee training was harmless
because of its resolution of the proximate cause issue. However,
if this Court finds that a harmless error analysis was
inappropriate on the proximate cause issue then the issue of the
exclusion of expert testimony on training must be reevaluated.
The court of appeals found that the expert testimony
concerning the apportionment of fault was properly excluded
because it constituted a "legal conclusion" which could not be
rendered by an expert.

However, the court did not define the

term "legal conclusion" in its opinion.

The court of appeals

ignored a recent opinion of the Utah Supreme Court concerning
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which allows opinion
evidence even if the opinion "embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." A fair reading of the Utah
Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Span, 170 Utah Adv.
Rep. 16, 26, n. 1 (Utah 1991), indicates that the Supreme Court
is willing to give a very broad interpretation to Rule 704. In
Span, in which the only evidence that a fire was a criminal act
was the opinion testimony of one of the fire investigators, the
only limitation imposed on Rule 704 testimony by the Supreme
Court was that the expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
16

Id.

The court of appeals constructed a far narrower interpretation of
Rule 704 in its opinion in this case.

Span and this case leave

trial courts and practitioners with conflicting interpretations
of Rule 704. The conflict should be resolved by this Court.
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffensen
was injured in defendant Smith's Management
Corporation's ("Smith") grocery store by a
shoplifter attempting to flee from the store's
management. The jury found Smith was negligent, but the negligence was not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On
appeal, Mrs. Steffensen asserts the trial court
improperly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train
its employees as to the appropriate methods to
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2) charged
the jury on the law of foreseeability; and (3)
excluded certain expert testimony. We affirm.

Cite as
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IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
Pearl H. STEFFENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 910210-CA
FILED: October 29, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Scott Daniels
ATTORNEYS:
Richard B. McKeown and Bradley H. Parker,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Christopher A. Tolboe, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and
Jackson.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

FACTS
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered
a Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and
cigarettes. Gary Canham, the store's frontend manager, observed Mr. Burnett take beer
and cigarettes from the store's shelves. As Mr.
Burnett walked toward the front of the store,
Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might
attempt to leave the store without paying for
the merchandise. Mr. Canham immediately
informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King
manager, and together the two watched Mr.
Burnett from the office area at the front of
the store. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the
front of the store, he noticed the two managers and felt they were watching him. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a check-out
stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no
longer being watched, he got out of line and
walked quickly toward the door with the
merchandise.
The two managers then confronted Mr.
Burnett and asked him to come with them to
their office. As the three walked toward the
office, Mr. Rompus called out to another
employee at the front of the store, telling her
to call the police. As the group reached the
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke*
toward the exit, dropping the beer and cigarettes as he ran. Mr. Rompus yelled "stop him-see if you can stop him," in an effort to
engage the assistance of others. Responding to
the call for help, another employee attempted
to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett
dodged this employee, turning in a different
direction, and as he did so, ran directly into
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced* off
this employee directly into the plaintiff, Mrs.
I Steffensen, who was standing at the customer
service counter writing a check. The force of
the collision knocked Mrs. Steffensen to the
ground, where she struck her head on the tile
floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the hospital and has since suffered severe "stroke-
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like" paralysis to the entire left side of her
determined from the evidence presented
body
Management
Comm
v Graystone Pines, Inc ,
Subsequently, Mrs Steffensen commenced
652 P 2d 8%, 897 98 (Utah 1982) A directed
this action against Smith, claiming Smith was
verdict cannot stand when, reviewing the evi
negligent in dealing with Mr Burnett and that
dence in a light most favorable to the losing
this negligence caused her injury At the con
party, "there is a reasonable basis in (he evi
elusion of the presentation of evidence,
dence and in the inferences to be drawn ther
defense counsel moved for a partial directed
efrom that would support a judgment in [the
verdict on the grounds that Smith's failure to
losing party's] favor " Id at 898, see Penrod
deter Mr Burnett from shoplifting could not,
v Carter, 737 P 2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987)
as a matter of law, be a proximate cause of
Mrs Steffensen claims the trial judge's jury
Mrs Steffensen's injuries The trial judge
instruction c o n c e r n i n g pre a p p r e h e n s i o n
granted the motion and incorporated this
evidence was improper because reasonable
ruling in his instructions to the jury At the
minds could differ as to whether a failure to
conclusion of trial, the judge submitted
"deter" Mr Burnett from shoplifting was the
written interrogatories to the jury After deli
proximate cause of her injuries
beration the jury found Smith had acted
In Utah, a negligence claim requires the
negligently, but Smith's negligence did not
plaintiff to establish four elements that the
proximately cause Mrs Steffensen's injury
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that
defendant breached the duty (negligence), that
I PROXIMATE C A U S E
the breach of the duty was the proximate
Mrs Steffensen's first claim o f error is the
cause of plaintiffs injury, and that there was
trial court improperly granted Smith a partial
in fact injury Reeves v Gentile, 813 P 2d
directed verdict on the element of proximate
111, 116 (Utah 1991) Proximate cause is "that
causation During the trial, Mrs Steffensen
cause which, in natural and continuous sequ
proceeded on two theories of negligence First,
ence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening
Mrs
Steffensen asserted Smith had been
cause), produces the injury and without which
negligent in failing to train its employees to
the result would not have occurred It is the
use techniques to "deter" Mr Burnett from
efficient cause the o n e that necessarily sets
shoplifting and, alternatively, that Smith's
in operation the factors that accomplish the
employees negligently failed to utilize these
injury " State v Lawson, 688 P 2d 479, 482 &
techniques in dealing with Mr
Burnett
n 2 (Utah 1984) Further, there can be more
Second, Mrs Steffensen claimed Smith was
than one proximate cause of an injury so long
negligent in chasing and attempting to stop
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in
Mr Burnett after he broke away and ran
causing the injury See Anderson
v
Parson
Mrs Steffensen argued that both o f these acts
Red-E-Mix
Paving Co , 24 Utah 2d 128,
of negligence endangered the safety of Smith's
467 P 2d 4 5 , 46 (1970), Jaques v
Fammond,
customers and ultimately caused her injuries
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P 2d 133, 134 (1963)
At the close of evidence, Smith asked the
It is well established that the question o f
trial judge for a partial directed verdict, ruling
proximate cause is generally reserved for the
that as a matter of law, even if its employees
jury Godesky v Provo City Corp , 690 P 2d
had been inadequately trained about the need
541, 544 (Utah 1984), Ostler v Albina Tran
for deterrence and failed to utilize deterrence,
sfer Co, Inc , 781 P 2d 4 4 5 , 451 (Utah A p p
such failure was not the proximate cause of
I 1989), cert
denied,
795 P 2d 1138 (Utah
Mrs
Steffensen's injury
The trial court
i 1990) Only in rare cases may a trial judge rule
granted Smith's request and instructed the
as a matter of law on the issue of proximate
jury that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop
causation
and detention of Mr Burnett should not be
This principle is illustrated by several Utah
!
considered by the jury
Supreme Court decisions In Hams v Utah
You have heard testimony regarding
Transit Authority,
671 P 2d 217 (Utah 1983),
events that occurred prior to the
the passenger o f a jeep brought an action
time of the stop of the shoplifter,
against a bus company and the jeep dnver for
Mr Burnett
injuries sustained in a traffic accident The
You are instructed that none of the
trial court granted the bus company a directed
actions o f the Smith's employees
verdict, instructing the jury that if they found
prior to the stop and detention
the jeep dnver should have observed the bus
proximately caused plaintiffs inj
prior to the accident, they must find, as a
unes Therefore, you must not take
matter o f law, that the jeep dnver was the sole
this testimony into consideration
proximate cause of the accident On appeal,
when deliberating and making your
the plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer
decision
that the bus negligently contnbuted to the
accident and pointed to allegations that the
A directed verdict is only appropriate when
bus stopped t o o rapidly, failed to dnve out o f
the court is able to conclude that reasonable
the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights
minds would not differ on the facts to be
Id at 220 The Utah Supreme Court agreed
CODC-CO
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in the room, summary judgment on the issue
of proximate causation was proper.
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should
be taken from the jury only where: (I) there is
no evidence to establish a causal connection,
thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or
(2) where reasonable persons could not differ
on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation. Robertson v.
Sixpence Inns of America, Inc., 163 Ariz. 539,
789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990)(en banc).
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr.
Burnett could not have been the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury because
there was not an unbroken causal line between
this failure and Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
Specifically, Smith argues the act of apprehending Mr. Burnett, Mr. Burnett's decision to
run, and Mr. Burnett's physical encounter
with Smith's employees, were, as a matter of
law, intervening proximate causes and therefore broke the chain of causation flowing
from its failure to deter.
Smith correctly asserts that "a more recent
negligent act may break the chain of causation
and relieve the liability of a prior negligent
actor under the proper circumstances."
Godesky, 690 P.2d at 544. However, if the
subsequent negligent act is foreseeable to the
prior actor, both acts are concurring causes
and the prior actor is not absolved of liability.
Id. The issue is whether the subsequent intervening conduct, either criminal or negligent,
was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 545; Harris,
671 P.2d at 220. "A superseding cause, sufficient to become the proximate cause of the
final result and relieve defendant of liability
for his original negligence, arises only when an
intervening force was unforeseeable and may
be described with the benefit of hindsight, as
extraordinary." Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047.2
The fact that the final act which produces the
injury is the criminal conduct of a third party
does not preclude the finding that an earlier
negligent act was the proximate cause of
injury if the criminal conduct was, under the
circumstances, reasonably foreseeable. Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047; Mitchell, 697 P.2d at
246.
First, Smith cannot rely on its own subsequent acts of negligence to break the chain of
causation between an earlier act of negligence
and the injury. Only the unforeseeable acts of
another constitute an intervening proximate
cause. See State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 801
P.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. 1990); People v.
Gentry, 738 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Colo. 1987); Stare
v. Neher, 52 Wash. App. 298, 759 P.2d
475, 476 (1988), afPd, 112 Wash. 2d 347, 771
P 2 d 330 (L989). To hold otherwise would
allow tortfeasors to escape liability by committing additional acts of negligence following
an initial breach of a duty. Therefore, Smith's
apprehension of Mr. Burnett and the subsequent chase through the store did not break the
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

with the plaintiff and reversed the directed
verdict. The Harris court held it improper for
the trial judge to have taken the issue of proximate cause from the jury. The court explained: "Where the evidence is in dispute including the inferences from the evidence, the
issue should be submitted to the jury." Id.
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant
summary judgment on the issue of proximate
cause in an action where the plaintiff had been
injured in an automobile accident. The plaintiff claimed he was unable to see approaching
traffic in executing a left-hand turn because
a van owned by the defendant utility company
negligently blocked his view by remaining in
the intersection, and this was an intervening
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal,
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
summary judgment on the issue of proximate
cause. The court held that the issue of proximate cause may only be taken from the jury
where reasonable minds could not differ as to
what "was or was not the proximate cause of
the injury.'' Id. at 365 n.4. The court concluded that "in a situation involving independent intervening cause, the primary issue is
one of the foreseeability of the subsequent
negligent conduct of a third person, and in
this case, [the issue of proximate cause] must
be resolved by the finder of fact." Id. at 365
(emphasis added).
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d
240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's summary judgment for
defendant on the issue of proximate causation
because the court found no evidence of proximate cause and detennined that, without
evidence, the issue would have been left to
juror speculation. In Mitchell, dependents of a
murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful
death action against the hotel after the deceased had been unexplainedly murdered in his
hotel room. Plaintiffs sought to prove that the
hotel management was negligent in its security
measures and that such negligence proximately
caused *he murder. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's
summary judgment for the defendant. The
court held that because there was no evidence
as to how the murderer entered the deceased's
room, plaintiffs had failed to show a factual
connection between the negligent security
measures and the murder. The Mitchell court
recognized that the murderer could have
entered the room in a number of ways, many
of which would have had no connection with
the hotel's security measures, including by
invitation of the deceased. Because plaintiffs
bore the burden to show defendant's conduct
was a 'substantial causative factor that led to
the [guest's] d e a t h / id. at 246, and because
plaintiffs had offered no evidence other than
mere speculation as to how the murderer got
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chain of causation.
Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett was not a
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a matter
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. Steffeof law, that Mr. Burnett's acts following
nsen's injury. There was probably sufficient
apprehension broke the chain of causation
evidence produced from which a reasonable
between Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett
j u r o r could infer that Smith's failure to deter
and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. Substantial
was a negligent act, 5 as it would have been
evidence before the jury indicated that Smith
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately
could have reasonably foreseen a customer
trained employee that his or her decision to
would be injured by a shoplifter's decision to
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store
run, particularly when, instead of deterring the
could have led to a customer's injury.
shoplifter, Smith chose to "play cat a n d
However, this does not end our inquiry. If
mouse" with him. Certainly Mrs. Steffensen
the trial c o u r t ' s partial directed verdict was
presented evidence on this theory of causation.
harmless error, we need not reverse. See Utah
A closer question is whether any reasonable
R. Civ. P . 61 (1991); State v. Verde, 770 P 2d
juror could conclude that the evidence and all
116, 120 (Utah 1989). On appeal, the appellant
reasonable inferences drawn from it show
has the burden of demonstrating an error was
Smith's failure to deter was a contributing
prejudicial—that there is a "reasonable hk
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
elihood that the error affected the o u t c o m e of
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced
the proceedings.* Verde, 770 P.2d at 120
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing
Further, in determining whether a trial court's
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent
error was harmful, we must look beyond the
shoplifting and thus p r o m o t e customer safety.
mere fact of error and consider in totality all
During trial, Mrs. Steffensen presented testithe evidence and proceedings below. See, e.g ,
mony from security and shoplifting experts
Anderson
v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah
who testified that Smith's employees failed t o
1983) (erroneous jury instruction not reversible
use reasonable means to handle M r . Burnett, a error when considered in light of all instructsuspected shoplifter, sufficient to protect the
ions and evidence). Although normally we
safety of the store's customers. These experts
would be reluctant to uphold an erroneous
identified two specific a n d generally accepted
directed verdict on harmless error grounds, in
techniques that retail stores employ when
this case we cannot ignore the fact that the
dealing with shoplifters and which Smith
j u r y ' s verdict would not have differed had the
failed to implement. First, the experts testified
trial judge not granted Smith's partial directed
that a retail store should take steps to * deter"
verdict.
a suspected shoplifter from carrying out bis or
At trial, M r s . Steffensen presented substaher plan by taking such affirmative action as
ntial evidence of Smith's negligence: the
making direct eye contact with the suspected
store's failure to deter M r . Burnett's shoplishoplifter, approaching the suspected shoplifting, the negligent apprehension a n d holding
fter and offering assistance, a n d calling for j of M r . Burnett, a n d the improper pursuit of
security over, the public intercom system, j M r . Burnett once he ran for the d o o r . The
Second, the experts testified that a retail store
trial c o u r t ' s partial directed verdict removed
should also train its employees to use care
from the j u r y ' s consideration only the portion
when apprehending a shoplifter. T h e experts of this evidence relating to Smith's actions
agreed t h a t employees should not chase or use
before Mr. Burnett's apprehension. In returforce with a shoplifter who becomes violent or
ning a verdict for the defendant on the remaflees. These experts testified that stores
ining evidence, the jury found that although
employ, or should employ, such techniques
Smith had acted negligently, the negligence did
primarily to protect the safety of their custonot proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injmers and to prevent incidents precisely like the
uries. Therefore, the jury must have concluded
one which occurred in this case. 3 In addition,
that either: (1) the post-apprehension neghMrs. Steffensen submitted copies of S m i t h ' s gence was t o o attenuated and remote from the
employee training manuals which advocated
injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2)
deterrence when dealing with shoplifters. 4 M r .
M r . Burnett's attempt t o flee was an unforeBurnett was, in fact, deterred when he thought
seeable superseding proximate cause of the
Smith's employees were watching while he was
injury. W e cannot see how the jury would
in the store. He went to get in the check o u t
have reached a different conclusion had it
line and waited there until he believed he was
been allowed to consider acts Smith perfonot being watched. Further, M r s . Steffensen's
rmed, o r failed to perform, prior to appreheexperts testified t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y five
nding M r . Burnett. Accordingly, we find it
percent of all shoplifters, when a p p r e h e n d e d , I highly unlikely the jury would have changed
r u n . They likewise testified that the p r o p e r use j its proximate cause decision h a d the trial judge
of deterrence techniques can reduce this submitted t o them the issue of Smith's failure
number by reducing the number of shoplifters
t o deter M r . Burnett's shoplifting. Therefore,
as a whole.
we find the trial court's partial directed
verdict o n the issue of proximate causation to
T h u s , we are hesitant to u p h o l d t h e trial
b e , at most, harmless error.
c o u r t ' s ruling that, as a matter of law,

I
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IL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial court
incorrectly stated the law with regard to foreseeability when it instructed the jury concerning her second theory of negligence-the
post-apprehension chase. We review challenges to jury instructions under a "correctness"
standard. See Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 114 P.2d 1,2 (Utah App. 1989).
The trial court's jury instruction number
thirty-two charged the jury that:
Foreseeability in these instructions
means injury or harm, if any, to a
customer which the defendant and
its employees could have reasonably
anticipated as the natural consequences of their actions, if any, even
though they were not able to anticipate the particular injury which
did occur. In determining what is
foreseeable, you must determine that
the actions
by Burnett
were
predictable by Smith's employees
and not just a mere possibility.
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction improperly focused on the particular acts of Mr.
Burnett, rather than focusing on shoplifters in
general. We agree that the specific identity of
the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of
foreseeability. See Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183
(foreseeability that criminal act will occur
establishes duty). However, it is unnecessary
for us to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen's
claim because any error committed by the trial
judge was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61
(1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 (Utah 1989).
The question of foreseeability goes to the issue
of negligence, and the jury found Smith negligent. Therefore, any error in defining foreseeability did not affect the jury's verdia.
ID. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of error is the
trial judge improperly excluded portions of her
expert testimony. First, the trial court forbade
one of Mrs. Steffensen's experts from testifying about Smith's employee training practices
as they related to the way its employees handle
shoplifters. Second, the trial court did not
allow Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an
opinion as to the relative proportion of fault
between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges to
evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of
expert testimony, are reviewed under a deferential "clear error" standard. See Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427
(Utah App. 1990). Further, an appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that the excluded
evidence could have influenced the jury. to
render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas,
806 P.2d 744,746 (Utah App. 1991).
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A. Testimony On Employee Training
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court
should have admitted expert testimony concerning Smith's failure to adequately train its
employees regarding the proper handling of
shoplifters, including techniques for deterring
shoplifting. At trial, the judge did not permit
Smith to introduce this expert testimony on
the grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr.
Burnett could not have been the proximate
cause of the injury, and therefore the testimony was irrelevant.
Our resolution of the proximate cause issue
relating to shoplifter "deterrence* mandates a
finding that if this ruling was error, the error
was harmless. Furthermore, the exclusion of
any training evidence relating to Smith's
employees chasing Mr. Burnett was also harmless as the jury found Smith negligent in its
apprehension and chasing of Mr. Burnett.
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault
Mrs. Steffensen's final argument is that her
expert witness should have been allowed to
render an opinion concerning the relative fault
of Smith and Mr. Burnett. Smith contends the
trial court's ruling was correct because the
apportionment of fault requires the expert to
render a legal conclusion and is thus inadmissible under Utah law. We agree with Smith
that the apportionment of fault requires a
legal opinion and, therefore, such a determination should be reserved for the jury.
This court recently considered the question
of what expert opinions are permissible as
going to the "ultimate issue,"* and what expert
opinions are inadmissible as "legal" conclusions. See Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1230-32. In
Davidson, we held the trial court properly
excluded an expert opinion which concluded
that the defendant was negligent. In doing so,
we stated that "[pjuestions which allow a
witness to simply tell a jury what result to
reach are not permitted." Id. at 1231. A
witness may testify as to the defendant's
actions, including whether the defendant acted
with care; however, the witness may not consider all the facts and render a final legal
conclusion. We find apportionment of fault
between parties to be exactly this type of
impermissible legal conclusion. It is for the
jury to place a legal proportion on the relative
faults of the parties. Therefore, we hold that
the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
regarding the relative proportion of fault
between Smith and Mr. Burnett was correct.
CONCLUSION
In summary, even if the trial judge improperly invaded the province of the jury by
granting Smith a partial directed verdia on the
issue of proximate causation, such error was
harmless given the jury's finding that Smith's
subsequent negligent acts were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
Further, any error in defining "foreseeability"
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for the jury was rendered harmless -by the
jury's finding that Smith was negligent.
Finally, the trial court correctly excluded
expert testimony which would have improperly
rendered a legal conclusion as to the proportion of fault betiween Smith and Mr. Burnett.
Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict for
defendant.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding
Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T . Greenwood, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Although the trial judge both granted a directed
verdict and incorporated his ruling in the court's
jury instructions, we conclude the ruling is most
accurately characterized as a partial directed verdict.
A directed verdict makes a determination as to an
element of a cause of action, and takes such determination from the purview of the jury—as was
done here. The Utah Supreme Court characterized
the same action of a tnal judge as a directed verdict
in Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 219
(Utah 1983). In Harris, a personal injury action
stemming from a jeep-bus collision, the trial judge
instructed the jury that if they found that the defendant jeep driver should have observed the bus,
then they must conclude, as a matter of law, the
jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the collision, thereby precluding liability stemming from
the bus driver's actions. Id. On appeal, the Utah '
Supreme Court recognized that this instruction was
in fact a directed verdict and treated it as such. The j
trial judge's ruling in this case is indistinguishable
from the ruling in Harris, and therefore we likewise
consider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict
and review it accordingly. See also Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608
(Utah 1982Xmotion for directed verdict tests the
sufficiency of the evidence).
2. See also George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117
(Utah App. 1990Xin wrongful death action, trial
court improperly took proximate cause from jury on
grounds that nurses' failure to notify doctors of
patient's worsening condition was not proximate
cause because of subsequent intervening negligence).
3. Smith's experts also agreed that these techniques-deterrence and refraining from using force or
chasing the shoplifter—arc valid security methods.
Their testimony, however, asserted that Smith's
employees had been adequately trained in these
procedures and properly followed the procedures
during the Burnett shoplifting incident. ,
4. Smith's employee manuals contain statements
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in handling shoplifters:
Make sure that employees on the sales
floor are greeting and making eye
contact with customers, especially those
who are acting suspiciously. Make use
of the intercom system by calling for
security from time to time. Very effective tool, it gives the potential shoplifter
an uneasy feeling that security is in the
store.
Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its
employees regarding the importance of customer
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safety in handling shoplifters:
Our company policy is that no employee
is to take any action in the apprehension
of a shoplifter which will bring harm to
himself, to other employees, or to customers. The most important thing to
remember about apprehending a shoplifter is that we do not want anyone
injured. There is nothing in the store
that is worth a person getting hurt for.
Use common sense, if the situation
can't be properly controlled let the
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license
number.
5. We recognize the trial judge's decision finding
Smith owed Mrs. Steffensen a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect her from the criminal
acts of third parties was correct. Since trial, the
Utah Supreme Court has visited the issue of a shopowner's duty to protect customers from the criminal
acts of third parties. See Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). In Dwiggins, the
Utah Supreme Court adopted section 344 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating landowners
have a duty to business invitees to take reasonable
steps to protect invitees from the criminal acts of
third parties where such acts are reasonably foreseeable. The Dwiggins court held where a jewelry
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a
robbery is not foreseeable. However, Dwiggins is
distinguishable because the store in question was the
most frequently shoplifted store in the Smith's
chain. Further, the fact that Smith's employee
manuals advocate the safe handling of shoplifters
demonstrates Smith did, in fact, foresee such criminal acts. Therefore, we believe the trial judge properly Jound that because customer injury from
shoplifters was foreseeable, the law imposed a duty
on Smith to take reasonable measures to protect its
customers from injuries resulting from dealing with
shoplifters. See also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744
P.2d 43, 4649 (Colo. 1987)(store owner had a
duty to take reasonable security measures to protect
customers where store had been subject of armed
robbery ten times in past three yearsXrelied on by
Dwiggins, 811 P.2dat 183 n.l).
6. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704 (1991).
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ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No, 910210-CA

Smith's Management Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed November 12, 1991,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this

I(

FOR THE COURT:

Mary I./Noonan
Clerk V f the Court

day of November, 1991 <

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 2 0th day of November, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the
United States mail to the parties listed below:
Richard B. McKeown
Bradley H. Parker
Parker, McKeown & McConkie
Attorneys at Law
The Woodlands Business Complex, Suite 500
4001 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Christopher A. Tolboe
Murphy, Tolboe & Maybe
Attorneys at Law
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Dated this 2 0th day of November, 1991.

Deputy Clerk

ADDENDUM C

EXHIBIT C

1

I

SALT LAKE CITYr UTAH; JANUARY 31, 1990; A. M. SESSION

2

(REPORTER'S NOTE:

3

proceedings were had in chambers, out

4

J

The following

of the presence of the jury:)

5

THE COURT:

For the record, this is the case of

6

Pearl H. Steffensen versus Smith Management Corporation.

7

C-870903662.

8

The record will show we are in chambers, the

I evidence has been concluded; as I understand it the

9

defendants have some motions.

10

MR. TOLBOE:

The first motion deals with a request

11

for a directed verdict.

The reason that we are asking for

12

that is pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-11-18.

13 I

statute as you are aware, provides for immunity from civil

14

liability as long as three things are met: one being that

15

the

That

—

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. TOLBOE:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. TOLBOE:

Excuse me, 78 what, again?
78-11-18.
Okay.
Three things must be met.

First,

20

Smiths has to have reason to believe that merchandise has

21

been wrongfully taken and that they can recover such

22

merchandise by taking the individual with the goods into

23

custody.

24
25

Second is that they must take the person into
custody and detain him in a reasonable manner, and third,

1

must detain him for a reasonable length of time.

2

standards are met, then Smiths cannot be held civilly liable

3

I

If those

for anything arising out of that particular incident.

4

In this particular situation, it has not been

5

argued —

6

minds could not differ, that Smiths indeed had reason to

7

believe that the person was leaving the store with items

8

I

9
10

in fact the facts have proven, and reasonable

that he had not paid for.
Number 2, that the detention was reasonable in all

I

regards, and number 3, that the length of custody obviously

11

was not excessive, and I think reasonable minds could not

12

differ to that issue, and therefore, request that the Court

13

render a directed verdict.

14

THE COURT:

I think if the plaintiff's evidence

15

were believed, and particularly if the plaintiff's experts

16

were believed, the jury could find that the detention was

17 I unreasonable under all the sections, and I think reasonable
18

minds could differ.

The motion will be denied.

19

MR. TOLBOE:

20

MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, I then have a motion for a

21

Okay.

directed verdict as to part of the case.

This motion would

22 I pertain to everything that occurred prior to the time that
23

Smith's employees detained and apprehended Bradley Burnett.

24 J And that's because of the alleged lack of eye contact,
25

failure to greet, standing in front of the doors with your

1

I arms crossed, call for security on the intercom, did not

2

| proximately cause Pearl Steffensen's injuries.

3

|

4

|

is dangerous, and that's not supported by the facts which

5

I

have come out at trial.

6

I

run, and none have ever collided with customers, according

7

I

to our experts.

8

1

9

I

Plaintiffs seem to argue that shoplifting per se

Only two out of 100 shoplifters

It is true that had we not apprehended the
shoplifter, there would have been no accident, but that's

10 I dealing seemingly with the "but for" analysis of causation.
11 I They need to go one step further and show these items
12

proximately caused the injury.

13 J

that had Bradley Burnett not gotten out of bed that morning,

14

there would have been no accident.

15

the "but for" analysis; had we not apprehended him, had we

16

used eye contact, had he put the items back, had we let him

17

through, there would have been no accident that would have

18

caused her injuries.

19

They could not merely show

If that's true, that is

They need to show there was some indicia about

20 I

this accident that made Bradly Burnett dangerous, likely to

21

run, and likely to collide with a customer causing an

22

injury.

23 J
24
25

There are no facts so indicating.
Moreover, as Mr. Tolboe indicated, we have a

right, a statutory right to stop and detain.
J according to the Utah Code.

That is clear,

Moreover, the employees'

1

obligation to their employer to stop employees [sic] and try

2

to regain possession of the merchandise which is being

3

stolen, but there is an utter lack of causation as to

4

everything that occurred prior to the time that the employee

5

stopped Bradley Burnett, the shoplifter.
THE COURT:

6
7

Which of you are going to respond to

that?

8

MR. PARKER:

9

Your Honor, I believe there is trial testimony,

10

Bradley Burnett's testimony, that had somebody approached

11

him and greeted him, or that when there was eye contact,

12

that that did prevent and deter, and that he even would have

13

put the beer back.

14

I will.

Even Smith's expert yesterday said that they

15

thought the incident began initially when they saw Bradley

16

Burnett and thought he looked suspicious.

17

of care that has been delineated by both our experts, and I

18

believe Smith's, is a standard that in —

19

recognizes that when dealing with shoplifters, people can

20

get hurt, and so that you deal with them on two levels:

21

one, you try and deal on the prevention level, because then

22

not only have you protected your goods, but you have

23

prevented people —

24

nipped it right in the bud.

25

then the second option is that at that point in time, you

And the standard

it inherently

you have prevented that harm, you have
And if you then can't do that,

1

apprehend.

But still safety is the most important thing on

2

your mind.

And that's printed right in Smith's own

3

documents.

4

The statutory language that they use is language

5

which talks about the civil liability between a shoplifter

6

and a store.

7

dirty hands or a party where the store has reason to

8

believe that he has dirty hands, filing an action and with

9

the store then saying that if it is reasonable and you have

And it is talking about a shoplifter with

10

reason to believe he took something, that then he cannot

11

bring an action.

12

Now, we're claiming their actions in the whole

13

were not reasonable.

14

are dealing with shoplifters, be careful.

15

who was here yesterday, who said expect the worst; prevent

16

if you can.

17

increases the risk of injury because they are moving into

18

apprehension and that is increasing that risk of injury that

19

makes that in a causal case —

20

case.

21

But the testimony has been when you
Even Mr. Cocke,

That prevention, when you don't prevent it,

that is a causal part of the

You know, I think it is clear, that that is part

22

of a safety rule made to —

you are not going to have

23

problems with 95 percent.

24

percent.

25

customers, let's say you only have 100 every six months.

I might not say 98 percent.

95

But five percent, when you have all these

1
2

Five percent risk isn't an acceptable risk, so Smith's says
I use care, prevent first.

If you don't prevent when you

3

apprehend, do it in a safe manner.

4

control, let them go.

5

If it gets out of

It is one big picture.

To bifurcate it and say none of this other counts,

6

it doesn't have anything to do with safety, that's wrong

7

here.

8

J

And our claim is Smith's broke their own safety

rules, and as a result Pearl is injured.

9

MR. HANSEN:

10

May I respond, your Honor?

Nothing in the law requires Smith's to use

11

deterrence.

Nothing at all.

The Utah Code allows us to

12

apprehend and detain.

13

before, I would like to know how the alleged lack of eye

That is clear.

And as I indicated

14 J contact, failure to greet, standing in front of the door
15

with your arms crossed, calling for security on the

16

intercom, failure to sign off on the shoplifting manual., had

17 I anything to do with Pearl's injuries.
18
19 J

Shoplifters are not per se dangerous.
talking about petty larceny.

We are

They would like the court to

20 I believe that you ought to prevent shoplifting because there
21

is something inherently dangerous about shoplifting.

22 J percent do run.
23

But in all of Mr. Cocke's experience, in

all of Mr. Senewald's experience, not one shoplifter has run

24 I and then injured a customer.
25

Five

before.

It just has never happened

1

I

THE COURT:

Well, I am inclined to agree that the

2

| actions that took place prior to the time that the

3

| shoplifter was detained couldn't reasonably be found to be

4

J

the proximate cause of the injury, and I think that motion

5

will be granted, I guess in terms of a partial directed

6

verdict, or we will have to have a jury instruction.

7

MR. HANSEN:

8

Could we have a jury instruction on

that, your Honor?

9

Your Honor, we do have one other motion, if we are

10

finished with this motion which has just been ruled upon.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. HANSEN:

We are.
That is, we would like the court to

13

rule that reasonable minds could not differ that Bradley

14

Burnett was negligent as a matter of law, or that he

15

intentionally collided with Pearl Steffensen.

16

THE COURT:

He certainly didn't intentionally

17

collide with Pearl Steffensen.

There is no indication that

18 J he intentionally collided with her.
19

MR. HANSEN:

We simply do not believe that

20

reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not he was

21

negligent.

22

THE COURT:

I think we will let the jury determine

23

that.

24

any other conclusion, but that he was negligent.

25

I

I tend to agree.

I don't see how you could come to

that would be evident for the injury.

I think

If they come back and

1

say he is zero percent negligent, I guess we will deal with

2

that at that time, but I just don't foresee that as a

3

possibility of some cause of action,

4

MR. PARKER:

Can I ask a question with regard

5

to the ruling you just made?

6

the case.

7

safety first.

8

J minds.

9

I don't know how that impacts

Our theory of the case is that Smith's didn't use
And that was the most important in their

One of the issues in this case is they didn't use

safety first because they didn't deter and prevent.

10

a deterrent mode.

11

first, prevention, and then catch him.

12

to arguing the case?

13

THE COURT:

It was

It was a catch him mode, not safety
So what does this do

I am not going to let you argue that.

14

You can argue that anything they did after the time that

15

they detained him was cause, for example not signing the

16

document, not signing the

17 j

MR. PARKER:

—

I am not going to argue that, but the

18

eye contact rule, the greeting rule, all of that stuff, that

19

would keep it from happening in the first place, keep the

20

incident of shoplifters low

21

MR. HANSEN:

22 j

THE COURT:

—

That's "but for."
I am not going to let you argue that.

23

| Signing the document is an —

24

| no proximate cause.

25

I

it is an example.

It is

And the other things are similar;

they're not quite as clear.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Okay.

Are there any other motions before we do

our jury instructions?
MR. TOLBOE:

No, sir, I don't believe so.
* * * * *
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